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Health Decisions
We should use this as a model and not make the same mistakes again.
Because plagues most certainly will happen again. Man is a biological
system, and we are always going to be attacked by infectious disease.
-Dr. Marcus Conant, AIDS researcher, on San Francisco's handling
of the AIDS epidemic.'
I. Introduction
States have the authority to exercise their police power to protect
public health. The law upon which this authority rests has been well
settled for decades. 2 The leading case,Jacobson v Massachusetts,3 was
decided in 1905; since that time, neither its language nor its ap-
proach has been explicitly updated, 4 despite a medical revolution
that has substantially changed the manner in which society con-
fronts disease. 5 Recent controversies involving two diseases, Ac-
quired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and herpes suggest the
urgency of clarifying the law governing state health actions under
the police power.
The late nineteenth century discovery that infectious diseases are
transmitted by infectious agents such as viruses and bacteria revolu-
tionized medicine. 6 The germ theory of disease was the basis for
the development of precise diagnostic and curative techniques,
changing the responses of doctors and public health officials to dis-
1. Epidemic of Fear, San Francisco ChronicleJan. 15, 1985, §2 (The World), at 13,18;
see also San Francisco Chronicle, Oct. 10, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
2. See infra note 28 and accompanying text. "That statutes of this nature . .. are
within the police power and thus constitutional generally is too well established to re-
quire discussion." McCartney v. Austin, 31 A.D.2d 370, 371, 298 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27
(1969). For a general discussion of the police power in health matters, see AIDS - A
New Reason to Regulate Homosexuality, 11J. CONTEMP. L. 315, 333-338 (1985).
3. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
4. See infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
5. See generally, G. ROSEN, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC HEALTH 294-5, 335-43 (1958); W.
McNEIL, PLAGUES AND PEOPLES 230, 346-7 (1976).
6. G. ROSEN, supra note 5, at 294-5, 314.
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ease. 7 WhenJacobson was decided this theory was still neither com-
pletely explicated nor universally accepted, even in the medical
community." Jacobson and its companion cases reflected a judicial
belief that common sense was at least as important as medical ex-
pertise in assessing medical risks and selecting public health re-
sponses. There were very few things that doctors could do to
hinder the spread of disease, and the things they could do - vacci-
nate and quarantine - were based on simple and accessible prem-
ises that the public could apply as well as physicians. 9
Medicine today is firmly established as a science, whose practi-
tioners possess special expertise largely inaccessible to the layman.
Through application of this expertise, most of the diseases that ter-
rorized mankind at the time ofJacobson have been all but eliminated
as public health threats in the United States. '0 The dramatic, large-
scale use of public health measures such as quarantine and adult
vaccination is now rarely justified by medical necessity. The modern
battle against disease is fought through research, public education
and improved individual treatment. I I This change has two major
implications. First, medical expertise has become a prerequisite to
accurate assessment of public health threats and responses. Com-
mon sense no longer provides an adequate measure of the necessity
or efficacy of a given health action. Second, medical approaches to
public health problems conflict with public demands in more and
more instances. While it is obvious that medical knowledge has
changed vastly in the past century, there is little to suggest that basic
human respones to disease have changed at all. People are still
afraid of both disease and the sick.
Public health officials are left in an awkward position. On the one
7. Id. The discovery by Reed and Carroll that the mosquito was the carrier of yellow
fever virus provides an excellent case in point: "Reed and his co-workers showed that
while yellow fever was definitely transmissible, it was not contagious; in short, there was
no transfer of the disease by contact." Doctors no longer sought to isolate the sick from
the well, but rather to protect all from mosquitoes. Id. at 326. See also W. McNEIL, supra
note 5, at 236-37; Morgenstern, The Role of the Federal Government in Protecting Citizens From
Communicable Diseases, 47 U. CINN. L. REV. 537, 543-44 (1978).
8. G. ROSEN, supra note 5, at 319; C. WINSLOW, THE CONQUEST OF EPIDEMIC DISEASE
311-12, 330-31 (1943). The longstanding medical controversy over the basic causes of
disease was exemplified by the conflict between the adherents of the miasma theory and
those of the germ theory, which raged throughout the nineteenth century. Id. at 266-67.
9. "Until very recently, medical theories and treatments fitted into this tangle of con-
tradictory [popular health customs, folkways and beliefs] smoothly enough. . . . Like
popular folkways, medical theories were crudely empirical and excessively dogmatic."
W. McNEIL, supra note 5, at 209.
10. See Damme, Controlling Genetic Disease Through Law, 15 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 801,
801 n.l (1982).




hand, there may be clear public pressure for responses that are
medically inappropriate. On the other hand, there is legal language
which does not clearly state the criteria under which decisions are to
be made. This comment seeks to clarify the law governing state ac-
tion in assessing and responding to public health threats and con-
siders how the law acts to reconcile divergent scientific and lay views
of disease control. Section I examines the evolution of the law gov-
erning the health power and explains the legal criteria for evaluating
state action. Court decisions in police power cases have required a
sufficient medical basis for state action, but without providing legal
language to make this requirement explicit. Language recognizing
this requirement is found in health cases decided under Federal
statutes. This precedent should apply to police power cases. Sec-
tions II and III analyze recent cases involving the public school at-
tendance of children with herpes, and the continued operation of
homosexual bathhouses allegedly contributing to the spread of
AIDS in San Francisco. In both cases, the expert medical evalua-
tions which should be the necessary justification for any state health
action were either ignored, or tainted with extraneous political
judgements. The wrong decisions were reached, for the wrong rea-
sons, in the wrong ways. The comment concludes that the problems
raised in these cases are generic to public health law, and may only
be prevented in the future by a clarification of the premises and
standards for public health judgments.
I. The Power to Protect the Public Health
A. The Public Health Decision: An Analytic Model
In reviewing state health actions under the police power, courts
ask whether the action addressed a problem the solution of which
was a legitimate state purpose, and whether the action was reason-
ably related to achieving that purpose. Where fundamental individ-
ual rights are compromised, courts apply a stricter standard of
review, requiring both a compelling state interest and a showing
that the chosen action was the least restrictive means of achieving
it.12 Of course, problems arise as soon as one attempts to assign
meaning to words like "legitimate," "rational," "compelling" and
"restrictive." In public health law, these terms must be defined to
allow only those measures which are medically necessary or justi-
fied. Courts have recognized this, and moved, either explicitly or
12. AIDS - A New Reason to Regulate Homosexuality, supra note 2, at 332.
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implicitly, to adopt a model of public health decisions which allows
them to reflect current medical opinion while disregarding extrane-
ous public demands.' 3
Public health decisions may be understood analytically as having
two parts: first, an assessment of the risk posed by a disease and,
second, a choice of response. Risk assessment is a purely objective,
medical question; it is an analysis both of the severity of a disease
and the manner and likelihood of its transmission - a usually fatal
but non-contagious disease such as leukemia presents an altogether
different kind of public health risk from a highly contagious but
rarely dangerous disease such as chicken pox. Simply put, the risk
assessment tells us if there is a problem, and, if there is, charts its
boundaries. The choice of a response incorporates both medical
and non-medical factors. In this phase, the health official initially
measures possible responses against a medical standard of efficacy.
She may also engage in a cost/benefit analysis, in social and political
as well as economic terms; in fact, virtually any factor that may prop-
erly be considered by an administrator may be considered in the
response phase. The initial medical measurement, however, limits
her choice in that she may not select for non-medical reasons a re-
sponse which is more restrictive of individual rights than one of
equal or greater medical efficacy, or one which has no medical value.
The response phase simply tells us what to do about the medically
defined problem. ' 4
This model of the health official's decision process mirrors in a
prospective form the retrospective analysis of the reviewing court.
It provides a means of defining the terms used in the judicial analy-
sis. A state has a legitimate or compelling interest in a particular
health action when a medical risk assessment has established the
existence of a public health problem. To the extent that objectivity
is possible, this is an objective assessment, based solely on medical
and epidemiological data interpreted according to accepted scien-
tific principles. No regard is given in this phase to the problems
attendant upon attempting to address the necessity. The response
choice is reasonably related to the state's goal when it is a medically
13. See infra text accompanying notes 39-74.
14. Morgenstern, supra note 7, at 547, offers a three stage risk assessment analysis
consisting of scientific evaluation of the problem, scientific choice of an effective method
for measurement of the problem, and correlation of the results with designated govern-
ment program options; it is from these options that the political choice of response is
made. This model's thrust is identical to that of the model described here - that a





sound response to the risk as assessed. It is the least restrictive
means if it is the medically-justified response that entails the least
infringement on individual rights. The most medically sound re-
sponse is justified even if another response is less restrictive, less
costly or less controversial. At trial, the state must prove that its risk
assessment is justified by the medical evidence. The state's re-
sponse to a proven medical risk, however, is presumed valid unless
those attacking it prove it to be medically unjustified, or more re-
strictive than another choice of comparable medical effectiveness. 1 5
Because the health law may often be applied in controversial
cases, it is important to recognize that this analysis is not a method
of eliminating doubt, but of apportioning uncertainty. It is not the
nature of scientific evaluations to be one hundred percent certain.
Where no action is taken, the costs of a mistake - and fear of a
continuing threat, unrelieved by action - are borne by the public.
If action is taken, the costs of a mistake are borne by those whose
rights are compromised. Because uncertainty is inevitable, courts
must bear in mind that protecting one group from its costs simply
transfers those costs to another. The health law may be understood
as regulating the placement of this burden.
In the cases to be examined here, it is possible to trace the rela-
tively rapid disenchantment of the courts with a lay or common
sense view of increasingly complex medical problems, with a conse-
quent increase in dependence on a medically-based form of analysis.
The cases to be considered fall into three groups. The early cases
find the courts, at the end of the last great era of fundamental theo-
retical disagreement in the medical community, just beginning to
accept medicine as a science. The second group, beginning in the
15. Other discussions of the health power have referred to it as a constitutional bal-
ancing test, as in Equal Protection or Due Process decisions, which is both true and
misleading. Damme, supra note 10, at 804; Comment, An Evaluation of Immunization Regu-
lations in Light of Religious Objections and the Developing Right of Privacy, 4 DAYrON L. REV.
401,410. A balancing is built in to the review of decisions in the least restrictive means
analysis; moreover, in general in the response phase, the cost in individual rights will
tend to be considered as an element of the broader impact of possible responses. But
the legitimate or compelling state purpose - necessity - is established in the risk as-
sessment without reference to response and attendant abridgement of individual rights.
It is a threshhold test asking only if there is a credible risk to public health. Obviously,
subjectivity and prospective weighting may creep into the choice of the threshhold, see,
e.g., Kasper, Perceptions of Risk and Their Effects in Decision Making, in SOCIETAL RISK As-
SESSMENT 71 (1980), but, in principle, the test involves a comparison between the medi-
cal assessment of risk, and the strength of the medical evidence that supports it. Once
that assessment is accepted by a court, and the necessity of action to protect the public is
established, the state action may abridge any individual right so long as it is a medically
effective and least restrictive means to the end of protecting the public from danger and
is not arbitrarily and capriciously enforced. See infra note 200 and accompanying text.
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second decade- of this century and continuing to the present day,
shows courts adopting medical risk assessment and response stan-
dards demanded by rapid expansion of medical knowledge, but
without updating legal language to reflect the new requirement.
Courts did not explicitly state these standards because most police
power cases that arose in the past fifty years presented individuals
protesting, often for religious reasons, steps which were both gener-
ally accepted by the public and supported by the preponderance of
medical evidence.' 6 Courts simply did not see the challenging sorts
of cases that arise where lay and medical approaches to disease di-
verge drastically. It is these cases - those in which great public fear
exerts pressure on decision-makers for health measures which are
not supported by medical necessity - which require for their reso-
lution a clear explication of the language of the law. Examples are
found in the third group of health cases. Decided, in the absence of
dynamic police power litigation, under other law, these cases yield
an explicit statement of the fundamental role of medical risk assess-
ment and response choice in public health actions.
B. The Early Cases
The standard for the exercise of the police power in health is ex-
pressed in the leading Supreme Court case on the subject,Jacobson v
Massachusetts.17 Jacobson arose from the refusal of a Cambridge man
to follow an order of the town Board of Health requiring vaccina-
tion against smallpox. The risk of smallpox transmission was estab-
lished by uncontraverted evidence that smallpox was prevalent and
increasing in the community.' Jacobson joined battle on the issue
of whether vaccination was an effective response, asserting that vac-
cination was not medically justified and offering medical evidence to
that effect. In the Court's opinion, however, Jacobson was merely
stating a general theory, held by some in the medical profession, of
the inefficacy and danger of vaccination. The Court rejected this
claim: "What everybody knows the court must know, and therefore
• . . this court knows, that an opposite theory accords with the com-
mon belief and is maintained by high medical authority."' 9 The
Court could not adjudge the regulation inappropriate and still "at-
tach any value whatever to the knowledge which . . . is common to
all civilized peoples touching smallpox and the methods most usu-
16. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
17. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
18. Id. at 27-28.




ally employed to eradicate that disease .... ,"2o
Jacobson is characterized by an equipoise in the perceived value of
medical knowledge and common sense in assessing and coping with
medical risk. Every reference in the opinion to "the matured opin-
ions of medical men" is coupled with recourse to "the experience of
mankind." 2' The Court quoted a contemporary New York case,
Viemeister v. White,22 which recognized that the effectiveness of vacci-
nation was disputed by some lay and medical people, but pointed
out that:
[Vaccination] is accepted by the mass of the people, as well as by most
members of the medical profession ...
The fact that the belief is not universal is not controlling, for there is
scarcely any kind of belief that is accepted by everyone. The possibil-
ity that the belief may be wrong, and that science may yet show it to be
wrong, is not conclusive; for the legislature has the right to pass laws
which, according to the common belief of the people, are adapted to prevent the
spread of contagious diseases. . . .While we do not decide, and cannot
decide, that vaccination is a preventive of smallpox, we take judicial
notice of the fact that this is the common belief of the people of the
State, and with this fact as a foundation, we hold that the statute in
question is a health law, enacted in a reasonable and proper exercise
of the police power. 23 (emphasis added)
Jacobson reflects tension between the emerging medical under-
standing of disease and the lay view. 24 The case came at the end of
five decades of steady advances in the capacity of medical science to
prevent and control disease. 25 Even the most enlightened laymen,
however, were aware that the continuing efforts to understand the
etiology of disease were marked by fundamental and often bitter
theoretical conflicts; where science presented such marked alterna-
tives, 26 it was natural for laymen to feel qualified to choose among
them. Jacobson suggests that in situations in which the uncertainty
about the nature and contagion of a disease is equal in the public
and medical minds, the most reasonable solution in a democratic
society is to allow the majoritarian organs of government to resolve
20. Id. at 28.
21. Id. at 30-31, 37.
22. 179 N.Y. 235, 72 N.E. 97 (1904).
23. 197 U.S. at 34-5 (quoting Viemeister v. White, 179 N.Y. 235, 72 N.E. 97 (1904)).
24. Typical of this tension was the Court's placing of the principal medical evidence
in a four page footnote. 197 U.S. at 31 n.l. An in-depth review of the contemporary
medical knowledge was thought relevant, but not central.
25. See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
26. C. WINSLOW, supra note 8, at 363-66. For a glimpse at the state of knowledge in
1910, see id. at 370.
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that uncertainty according to their informed views of necessity.2 7
Jacobson, then, looked forward in requiring an assessment of medical
risk and response, but it looked backward in not leaving medical
judgments exclusively to medical experts.
Jacobson upheld the broad power of the state to identify and ad-
dress public health problems.28 The analysis of the propriety of this
particular application of the power was closely linked to the general
legitimacy of state action. Because the Court decided the case in
terms of the general legitimacy of the police power, and did not es-
tablish a medical standard for action in particular cases, Jacobson
failed to answer the central question before courts in modern public
health cases: is the application of the health power valid in this case?29
This question, naturally enough, was first posed in those cases in
which the court rejected a specific state action while accepting the
state's general power. It was in the effort to protect individual rights
without infringing upon state prerogatives that an emphasis on
medical evaluation first appeared.
In the 1895 case of In Re Smith, 30 the New York Court of Appeals
began its opinion by pointing out that in any evaluation of a health
regulation:
[I]t must appear very clearly and satisfactorily, not only that it [the
power to take the particular act] has been conferred by the law, but
also that in its exercise the facts were present which justified it. The validity
of the law is not so much called in question as the right to enforce its
provisions is. (emphasis added)3 '
In holding that county health officials could not quarantine two
haulers who had refused vaccination simply because their business
brought them in and out of areas where smallpox was epidemic, the
court required a showing "if they are not actually 'infected' with dis-
ease, that they have been 'exposed' to it, and that the conditions actu-
ally exist for a communication of contagion .... ."(emphasis added)3 2 In
short, a valid grant of authority did not relieve the health commis-
sioner of his obligation to make a medical evaluation of the risk and
choose a medically sound response.33
27. 197 U.S. at 30-31.
28. Id. at 37-38.
29. See also State ex rel Freeman v. Zimmerman, 86 Minn. 354, 90 N.W. 783 (1902);
Blue v. Beach, 155 Ind. 121, 56 N.E. 89 (1900).
30. 146 N.Y. 68, 40 N.E. 497 (1895).
31. Id. at 73, 40 N.E. at 498.
32. Id. at 76, 40 N.E. at 499.




The 1900 case ofJeu, Ho v. lWilliamson,34 places even greater em-
phasis on medical criteria in evaluating state action. San Francisco's
health officials found nine fatal cases of what they diagnosed as
bubonic plague in a primarily Chinese neighborhood of the city.
They quarantined some ten thousand Asians in a twelve-square
block area. The plaintiff sought an injunction against the quaran-
tine on two grounds. First, he disputed the diagnosis, offering the
testimony of medical specialists whose expertise in the plague far
surpassed that of the city's doctors. Second, conceding the exist-
ence of the epidemic arguendo, he asserted that the quarantine was
improperly and ineffectively enforced: instead of quarantining the
houses and contacts of the plague victims, the entire neighborhood
was closed down; additionally, the boundary was shifted on a house
by house basis in order not to quarantine whites who lived along the
border.35
Relying on medical evidence, the court held that the quarantine as
enforced was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment not only because it was clearly applied in a dis-
criminatory fashion, but also because its scale was not reasonably
related to the goal of preventing plague as judged by normal medi-
cal standards. 36 The Court did not, however, foreclose a quarantine
of the homes and contacts of the nine who had died. Although it
observed that the best evidence suggested there had probably never
been any plague, it deferred to the health department's assessment
of risk and declined to offer a judicial opinion on the question, this
being one that "courts ... are disposed to leave to boards of health
to determine upon such evidence as their professional skill deems satisfac-
tory." (emphasis added) 37 An acceptance of a lay or common sense
assessment of the risk played no role in the Court's decision. In
both Smith andJew Ho, it is possible to detect the first glimmerings
of judicial recognition that health decisions were becoming too
complex and too prone to abuse to be made without reference to
objective medical standards. 38
34. 103 F. 10 (9th Cir. 1900).
35. Id. at 12,13.
36. Id. at 21-24.
37. Id. at 26.
38. There were contemporary decisions in which courts maintained a very limited
view of medical evidence. See, e.g., Potts v. Breen, 167 111. 67, 47 N.E. 81 (1897) (vaccina-
tion regulation invalid because the state had not shown the presence or danger of a
smallpox epidemic). One should note that even inJacobson the vaccination question was
still decided in the context of an actual epidemic. Comment, supra note 15,at 405. It was
another fifteen to twenty years before courts were prepared to interpret vaccination as a
preventive measure. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
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C. The Implicit Acceptance of Medical Standards
In the first twenty years of this century, medical science began to
present a united professional front as the discoveries of the late
nineteenth century produced dramatic results. 39 There was an en-
hancement of the perceived authority of medical pronouncements. 40
Courts gave less weight to the lay perception of disease, and more
to medical evaluations of risk and response. The general legitimacy
of the state's police power was no longer a sufficient basis for action
in the absence of a specific medical justification.
In 1913, Board of Health of Covington v. Kollnan4'1 upheld sanitary
milk bottling rules despite plaintiff's claim that the measures did not
prevent disease. The court discounted the plaintiff's suggestion that
scientific theories were too unreliable and changeable to serve as a
basis of fair law:
In matters affecting the public health it is the part of reason and com-
mon sense to adopt the best scientific thought of the age in which we
live. If research and investigation lead to other accepted theories,
then we must adopt them. Were the rule otherwise, both the courts
and the Legislature would be without a competent guide. Viewing the
matter in the light of the accepted theories of science at the present
time, [this] regulation . ..is neither unreasonable nor oppressive. 4 2
The court was aware not only of the rapid development in medical
science, but also that common sense alone would no longer serve as
a "competent guide" in adjudicating the appropriateness of particu-
lar health actions that compromised important individual rights. 43
By 1922, in People ex rel Barmore v. Robertson,44 the Illinois Supreme
Court understood: "Public health measures have long been recog-
nized and used, but the science of public health is of recent origin,
and with the advances of the science, methods have greatly al-
tered." 45 Not only in its dicta, but also in its holding, the court man-
ifested a confidence in and reliance on medical evidence. Barmore
was a boarding-house keeper who, laboratory analysis showed, was a
39. G. ROSEN, supra note 5, at 294.
40. See, e.g., Id. at 493-4; C. WINSLOW, supra note 8, at 379-80.
41. 156 Ky. 351, 160 S.W. 1052 (1913).
42. Id. at 352, 160 S.W. at 1054.
43. See also Crayton v. Larabee, 220 N.Y. 493, 503, 116 N.E. 355, 358 (1917). This
was by no means a clear and conscious trend. In the same year, the Supreme Court of
Errors of Connecticut, holding that an officer must have reasonable grounds to believe
in the infection of a person quarantined and observing that the origin of the police
power "rests in necessity," still noted that "[clommon knowledge tells us that conta-
gious diseases may be spread by those who have been exposed. State v. Racskow-
ski, 86 Conn. 677, 681, 86 A. 606, 608 (1913).
44. 302 Ill. 422, 134 N.E. 815 (1922).




carrier of typhoid. A lay view of contagion might have resulted in a
conclusion that Barmore was not contagious: her husband did not
have typhoid, and none of her boarders who developed the disease
did so while living in her house. The court, however, relied on labo-
ratory evidence of her infection in upholding a quarantine. 46 The
Barmore decision reflected the same growing appreciation of scien-
tific methodology and preventive medicine as Zucht v. King.47 There,
the Supreme Court upheld an ordinance that set vaccination as a
prerequisite for school attendance without regard to the actual or
imminent presence of an epidemic. Jacobson's requirement of both
an assessment of risk and an evaluation of response survived; its be-
lief in the equality of lay and medical evaluations did not. Both
Zucht and Barmore suggest a major step in judicial conceptualization
of the role of public health actions. Doctors were now fighting dis-
ease on a broad scale, moving to deal effectively with diseases whose
presence was not even recognized by the public. In judging such
actions, courts found doctors' expertise indispensible.
Since Zucht, there has been little change in the implementation of
health law under the police power. A medical assessment of risk
and response is required, but the requirement is still most often
stated in the language ofJacobson. The authority of the state to pro-
tect the public health has achieved virtually unanimous political,
legal and social acceptance. 48 Supported by this acceptance, the
46. Id. at 433-434, 134 N.E. at 819-820.
47. 260 U.S. 174 (1922).
48. There have been few attempts to attack the power to make or delegate such
measures on a broader basis, and such arguments have been dismissed with only a cur-
sory recital of the state's well established authority. See Mack v. Board of Education, I
Ohio App. 2d 143, 204 N.E. 2d 86 (1963) (upholding power of school boards to require
vaccination); Allen v. Ingalls, 182 Ark. 991, 33 S.W. 2d 1099 (1931) (emergency not
necessary to justify immunization); Pierce v. Board of Education of City of Fulton, 219
N.Y.S. 2d 519 (1961) (presence of smallpox in school district not necessary to validity of
vaccination requirement). The trend towards broad acceptance of government power to
act in matters of health was bolstered in the 1930's by the removal of the Due Process
barriers which had severely limited federal health action. Morgenstern, supra note 7, at
543-44.
Most litigation has come in response to technologically novel measures or particular
actions that seemed arbitrary or capricious. There have been cases involving water
flouridation, e.g., Beck v. City Council of Beverly Hills, 30 Cal. App. 3d 112, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 163 (1973); zoning laws based on sanitary considerations, e.g., People v. Johnson,
129 Cal. App. 2d 1, 277 P.2d 45 (1955); and disease reporting requirements, e.g., Schul-
man v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp., 44 A.D.2d 482, 355 N.Y.S.2d 781,
aff'd, 38 N.Y.2d 234, 342 N.E.2d 501, 379 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1974).
Perhaps the most common kind of case has involved the assertion of religious or other
ideological objections to the mandatory school vaccination requirements that exist in
every state. Morgenstern, supra note 7, at 543. These are not attacks on vaccination as a
principle, but attempts to secure an individual exemption. Davis v. State, 294 Md. 370,
451 A.2d 107 (1982); Maier v. Besser, 73 Misc.2d 241, 341 N.Y.S.2d 411 (1972); Board
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medical standard, though not explicitly stated by courts, has gener-
ally been applied in public health cases. Only recently have
problems arisen which require a clearer statement of the health law.
D. The Explicit Adoption of Medical Standards
Perhaps because the law with respect to police actions has ap-
peared so settled, litigants seeking to challenge state health meas-
ures have relied on other grounds for a cause of action. These
include recent Federal statutes granting special protections or enti-
tlements, such as the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Education
for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHC), 49 and newly developed
of Education v. Maas, 56 N.J.Super. 245, 152 A.2d 394 (1959), cert denied, 363 U.S. 843
(1960); Dunham v. Board of Education, 154 Ohio St. 469, 96 N.E.2d 413 (1951).
There have also been, throughout this period, attempts to limit the state's power on
due process grounds. Rather than attacking the risk assessment or even the response on
a medical basis, such cases frequently have turned on the procedures used in imple-
menting the response. They often have involved habeas corpus petitions by individuals
quarantined or forcibly examined for venereal disease or tuberculosis. See, e.g., In Re
Halko, 246 Cal. App. 2d 553, 54 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1966); People v. Strautz, 386 Ill. 360, 54
N.E.2d 441 (1944). These cases arose from the more systematic use of quarantine,
which was no longer applied to everyone suffering from TB or VD, but only to those
who were not perceived to be capable of conforming their behavior to prevent transmis-
sion. Thus, due process for them meant a fair chance to argue that they were, in fact,
able to police themselves. Because the health law is justified by necessity, even where
the plaintiff wins, he often loses. So for example, in In Re Halko, a man quarantined for
TB was granted a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that he had not been adequately
represented by counsel at his quarantine hearing; the court also, however, ordered him
confined for sixty days, in which time California could proceed to quarantine him with
due process. Thus it is clear that though due process was important, the risk the plaintiff
was believed to pose was, as a practical matter, decisive.
Finally, some health actions have been overturned simply because they reflect moral,
rather than medical, imperatives. See, e.g., State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 381 A.2d 333
(1977) (anti-fornication statute not justified by declared goal of preventing venereal
disease).
49. See e.g., infra notes 51-54, 71 and accompanying text. The Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1405-1420 [hereinafter EAHC], man-
dates the provision of a "free, appropriate public education" to handicapped children by
recipients of federal education funding; section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 20
U.S.C. §794 [hereinafter Rehabilitation Act], provides that "[n]o otherwise qualified
handicapped individual . . . shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance ... "
Recently, several courts have interpreted these federal statutes as foreclosing plaintiffs
from the remedies traditionally available under the law governing state police actions.
For example, in August, 1985, Ryan White, a hemophiliac with AIDS, sought a prelimi-
nary injunction ordering his local school board to reverse its decision to bar him. White
claimed that the school board's action violated his rights under the EAHC, the Rehabili-
tation Act, the Civil Rights Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), and the Due Process and Equal
Protection clauses of the United States Constitution. White v. Western School Corp.,
No IP 85-1192-C, slip op. at 2 (S.D. Ind. August 16, 1985). The Federal District Court
refused White relief, saying that the EAHC provided White with his exclusive remedy,
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Constitutional protections, such as the right of privacy. 50 Thus, im-
portant decisions involving.the same issues as the classic health ac-
tion cases have been decided without explicit reference to the police
power. While formally decided under different law, these cases con-
front the problems that arise when health risks must be assessed and
responses chosen where medical and lay perceptions of a health
problem diverge. In these cases, courts have explicitly applied
strict rules of medical evidence in testing the validity of state health
actions. Both because the issues are identical, and because there is
available only after proceeding through the four levels of state hearings required by the
F-AHC. Id. at 4.
The court based its ruling on Smith v. Robinson, 104 S.Ct. 3457 (1984). That case
was brought by parents of a child with cerebral palsy "and a variety of physical and
emotional handicaps," Id. at 3461, caught in a fight over what state agency would fund
his special education. While the grounds of the parents' action in Smith were the same as
those in White, the specific issue before the Court was under which of several Federal
statutes, if any, attorneys' fees could be recovered. The Court held:
Congress intended the EHA to be the exclusive avenue through which a plaintiff
may assert an equal protection claim to a publicly financed special education. The
EHA is a comprehensive scheme set up by Congress to aid the States in complying
with their constitutional obligations to provide public education for handicapped
children. Both the provisions of the statute and its legislative history indicate that
Congress intended handicapped children with constitutional claims to a free appro-
priate education to pursue those claims through the carefully tailored administra-
tive and judicial mechanism set out in the statute.
Id. at 3468. The accuracy of this assessment will not be addressed here, but its applica-
bility to White is readily disputed. Even the legislative history cited by the Court in Smith
suggests that Congress was addressing the problem of children with handicaps not re-
ceiving the special assistance they needed in order to get access to an appropriate educa-
tion. Id. at 3468-3470. While it has been possible, as White itself indicates, to argue that
people with AIDS are handicapped within the meaning of these statutes, the situation is
the converse of the usual contemplated by the EHA. Instead of a school board refusing
to take the action required to secure to a handicapped child the means of getting an
education, the board in White acted to bar the child: in the usual case, the child cannot
get the appropriate education without state action - in the AIDS case, the child could
not get the appropriate education because of state action. It is stretching reason to regard
an action to bar a child deemed a public health threat as simply a placement issue under
the EHA.
Before the passage of the federal statutes, a plaintiff such as White would have had a
federal cause of action by virtue of the state's assertion of its police power. It is not
claimed anywhere in Smith that Congress intended to foreclose this longstanding rem-
edy. Moreover, it cannot be said that remedies available under the EHA are equivalent
to those available under the law governing police actions. The law of police actions
contemplates swift adjudication of the legality of a state's emergency infringement of
individual rights while the EHA was designed to encourage deliberate, and often drawn
out, consideration of educational placement alternatives. A state should not be able,
simply by labeling an object of state health action as a "special" child within the cover-
age of the EHA, ro prevent the swift vindication of its federal rights. For a child with
AIDS who wants a last brief chance to lead a normal life, the foreclosure of the availabil-
ity of a preliminary injunction based on the likelihood that he will prevail, the traditional
police action remedy, is often dispositive of the merits.
50. See infra notes 197-198 and accompanying text.
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frequently implicit reference to the police power, these precedents
should be applied in police power cases.
Typical of these recent decisions is a line of cases involving the
admission into regular schools of children who are carriers of Hepa-
titis B, a serious viral disease.5' In one of these cases, New 1"ork State
Association for Retarded Children, Inc. V Carey,52 the School Board of
the City of New York attempted to bar some fifty retarded children
infected with hepatitis B from school attendance. This failed in the
District Court.53 The Board then moved to segregate the children
within the school. 54 The Board's actions were sparked by a false
alarm of hepatitis infection of a teacher. 55 In the haste and panic of
its reaction, 56 the Board selected a severely flawed response; the
flaws were decisive in the Court of Appeals' affirmance of the Dis-
trict Court's rejection of the segregation plan. First, the Board,
which had been unable to formulate a plan in cooperation with the
Health Department,5 7 failed to show that its own assessment of the
risk justified a response that so severely compromised the children's
educational rights. The weight of the medical evidence suggested
that the children could safely attend regular classes with the adop-
tion of a few, minimally restrictive precautions. 58 Second, the Board
made a mistake akin to that of the city of San Francisco inJew Ho: if
the Board's assessment of the risk were accepted, then its response
was medically inadequate since it made no effort to identify and iso-
late all hepatitis B carriers in the school system. To the Court, this
approach "at least suggest[ed] that the Board did not regard its own
51. The hepatitis B virus is transmitted in blood and other body fluids; casual con-
tact does not spread the disease. THE MERCK MANUAL 837-838 (R. Berkow 14th ed.
1982) [hereinafter MERCK].
52. 466 F.Supp. 479 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), modified, 466 F.Supp. 487 (E.D.N.Y. 1979),
af§d, 612 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1979).
53. 466 F.Supp. 486-7. The court wrote:
Instead of following the New York City Department of Health's Guidelines or the
less restrictive procedures advocated by the United States Public Health Service or
the [New York State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities],
• . . the Board of Education adopted the present course of action which none of the
medical experts countenance.
Id. at 484-485.
54. Id. at 492-3. Many of the children had previously been residents of Willowbrook
State Hospital, but were now in community homes under a Federal consent decree. The
District Court found that the Board's action violated the Willowbrook consent decree,
the EAHC and the Rehabilitation Act as well as the Due Process and Equal Protection
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. This action was ultimately decided, however,
only under the EAHC. 612 F.2d at 649.
55. 612 F.2d 647.
56. 466 F.Supp. 492.
57. 612 F.2d at 647-648.




evidence of risk as particularly convincing." 59
In selecting standards for its review, the Court of Appeals was
clearly guided by the need to establish a medical justification for the
Board's action.60 The court rejected the Board's contention that the
District Court erred in conducting an inquiry into the adequacy of
the Board's own fact-finding, which, the Board claimed, should have
been judged solely for rationality, with the deference due to a legiti-
mate exercise of the state's power. The court recognized that no
such deference to the Board's version of the facts was justified
where the facts would be practically dispositive of important rights
or entitlements 6' - where, in other words, it was the facts them-
selves that were at issue. While finding that close, highly technical
calls would go to the qualified administrators, the court did not hesi-
tate to intervene when the overwhelming weight of the medical evi-
dence went against the state's action.62 This decision suggests a
very important role for courts in evaluating health actions. Because
action can only be premised upon necessity, courts may insist upon
satisfying themselves through expert medical testimony that risks
have been accurately assessed. Because responses that infringe
upon basic rights cannot be more restrictive than is medically neces-
sary to address the relevant risks, courts may themselves measure
responses against a medical standard.
The choice of medical standards does not always represent an es-
cape from uncertainty and the risk of incorrect decisions. Rather, it
represents a recognition that medical expertise offers the most ob-
jective and coherent standard available for dealing with uncertainty.
In fact, medical standards as evidentiary tools are most important
precisely when knowledge is most limited. LaRocca v. Dalsheim,63
the first case directly involving AIDS to come to trial,64 offers a
model for medical risk assessment in a judicial setting. A group of
prisoners at a New York state prison brought a class action to enjoin
the state from enforcing policies which they believed promoted the
59. Id. at 650.
60. The court interpreted the EAHC to require that government agencies and other
recipients of federal funds must establish a substantial justification for their actions. Id.
at 649-50. In refusing to accept the state's demand for a deferential standard of review,
the court here, as in Community High School District 155 v. Denz, 124 Il1. App. 3d 129,
463 N.E.2d 998 (1984), was depending less on the Supremacy clause than on the failure
of officials to sustain a burden of medical proof.
61. 612 F.2d at 648-49.
62. Id. at 650. A similar result was reached in Community High School District 155, supra
note 60.
63. 120 Misc.2d 697, 467 N.Y.S.2d 302 (1983).
64. Comment, AIDS: A Legal Epidemic?, 17 AKRON L. REV. 717, 731 (1984).
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spread of AIDS within the prison.65 (Thus, the inmates were not
acting against a health action, but, as private health officers, one
might say, seeking to establish quarantine, isolation and mandatory
examination.) Thejudge was acutely aware of the context of fear in
which this litigation was occuring, and discussed public and inmate
anxiety at some length:66 "Much of the apprehensiveness exists be-
cause no one is completely sure how AIDS is spread, and no one has
conclusive answers as to the relationship between contact and
risk." 67 This fear and uncertainty made it vital for the court to
"evaluate the risks by examining the known features of AIDS as
measured against the existing conditions" at the prison.68 Such a
measurement would, the judge recognized, provide certainty only
"to the extent that current scientific knowledge allows ... *"69 In
testing the necessity of action, the court properly recognized that
the nature of medical knowledge made both finality and certainty
impossible and inappropriate, and concluded:
The scientific knowledge. . . with regard to AIDS may be expected to
change, with each new medical advance. In a month, a practice ac-
cepted today may be discarded in favor of a new approach. . . . In a
matter of time, the ailment may be conquered, or inhibited by tactics
which are as yet unfathomed. The court cannot suitably act as an ad-
ministrative body on an on-going basis. The more practical solution
is to dismiss the action . . . with leave to renew the proceeding . . .
upon a claim that the State has acted improperly. 70
This candid acceptance of inevitable uncertainty should be a model
for courts in similar situations. Uncertainty can rarely be avoided.
Responses that purport to avoid it are likely to have an impact more
comforting than real; worse, in accepting comfort as a legitimate
goal, such responses may be overbroad and place an unacceptable
burden on disease victims.
The principle purpose of the health law is to protect public
health, but, as the cases above demonstrate, the health law is struc-
tured to protect individual rights as well by requiring all actions to
meet a test of medical necessity. This is to be seen in a line of cases
decided under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 7' involving the partic-
ipation of handicapped students in interscholastic sports. In fact sit-
65. 120 Misc.2d at 697-700, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 303-305.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 702, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 306.
68. Id. at 700, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 305.
69. Id. at 698, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 304.
70. Id. at 710, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 311.




uations free of the distortions that come with fear and associated
political pressures, the courts explicitly held that the states may not
infringe upon individual rights in the name of health on any basis
less than valid medical necessity, however well-intentioned or sensi-
ble the action might be from a common sense point of view.7 2
The strongest case in this line is Grube v. South Bethlehem Area School
District.73 Several physicians, none of whom possessed any special
expertise in sports medicine, decided that a student with one kidney
should be barred from the football team. The boy and his family
consulted a sports medicine expert, who helped the student procure
special protective pads and testified at the trial that there was no
record of anyone suffering a serious kidney injury playing football.
In holding for the student, the court stated that neither philosophi-
cal judgments nor generalized medical concerns could replace spe-
cialized medical knowledge:
The evidence is clear that [none of the school's physicians] had any
facts which would permit them to make a medical evaluation of the
existence of a risk. In an understandable abundance of caution, all
three eventually concluded that the safest course was to say that Rich-
ard could not play. I conclude that the opinion of these three doctors
cannot serve as a substantial justification for the district's actions
where their decision lacks a medical basis.74
E. Summary
The cases examined demonstrate the courts' consistent move-
72. In the first of these cases, Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 533 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1977), a
school was held to have properly excluded visually impaired children from sports partic-
ipation on the basis of unrefuted medical testimony that such participation would be
dangerous. The need to refute medical testimony with experts of one's own did not,
apparently, go unnoticed by future litigants. Wright v. Columbia University, 520
F.Supp. 799 (E.D. Pa. 1981), involved another visually impaired student who wished to
play football. The court differentiated the case from Kampmeier because Wright
presented evidence on his own behalf from a highly competent opthalmologist.
Poole v. South Plainfield Board of Education, 490 F.Supp. 948 (D. N.J. 1980), con-
cerned a student barred from wrestling because he had only one kidney. The student
presented medical evidence showing the chance of injury to be slight, and the court
found that the school's physicians' objections were based more on their assessment of
the worth of sports than of medical risk. One school doctor was quoted as writing:
It is in the best interest of the students to bar them from contact sports despite the
wrath of both students and parents. How can you justify and explain to the student
who has one kidney and the other destroyed that his death or lifelong attachment to
a kidney machine was worth the 'glory'.
Id. at 952. As a later decision explained, "It was apparent to the court that both the
school system and the Board itself were making a philosophical and not a medical judge-
ment." Grube v. Bethlehem Area School District, 530 F.Supp. 418, 423 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
73. 530 F.Supp. 418 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
74. Id. at 424.
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ment towards adopting medical criteria for assessing public health
risks and responses. As the general legitimacy of state health action
has receded as an issue in police power cases, the language of "ra-
tional relations" and "least restrictive means" has come to be de-
fined by medical criteria. The holdings of later police power cases
make clear the state's obligation to medically justify individual
health actions. This approach is explicit in modern cases decided
under Federal statutes, such as Carey, LaRocca and Grube.
The appropriate standard for state action is clear: a state health
action is justified even if it infringes on individual rights if, 1) a med-
ical risk assessment has defined the health threat and its dimensions;
and 2) the chosen response is the least restrictive medically appro-
priate means of dealing with the risk. As the cases above show, the
standard has been applied and has worked. Recent cases involving
two sexually transmitted diseases, AIDS and herpes, have sug-
gested, however, that, because police power cases have left the stan-
dard implicit, it is frequently misapplied or ignored. The danger of
an implicit standard is that courts will not recognize it, particularly
when under pressure from a frightened public. In such cases, it may
be tempting to reconcile opposing demands by "making a philo-
sophical and not a medical judgment.- 75 Succumbing to this temp-
tation, however, may create more problems than it solves.
II. Herpes Goes to School
Sexually transmitted diseases seem to be particularly frightening
to the public. 7 6 But granting that, herpes still seems an unlikely
cause for fear. To begin with, most people already have it: eighty to
ninety-five percent of Americans carry one of the four principle vi-
ruses of the herpes family, 77 only one of which is usually sexually
transmitted.78 Apparently, fear of genital herpes and general confu-
sion about the herpes viral family have led to the stigma of sexual
transmission spreading to all the herpes viruses.79
The three forms of herpes not associated with sexual transmission
are herpes Zoster, Cytomegalovirus (CMV) and Epstein-Barr virus
75. Id. at 423.
76. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1985. at A6, col.i; Id., Jan. 21, 1985, at A18, col. 1.
77. The Ordeal of the Herpes Kids, TIME 57 (Jan.21, 1985) [hereinafter Ordeal].
78. MERCK, supra note 51, at 200, 1629; but see infra notes 87-89 and accompanying
text.
79. N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1985, §1, at 6, coIl. ; In Iowa, A Herpes Expert Confronts a




(EBV).8 0 Herpes Zoster is the virus responsible for chicken pox and
shingles."' CMV is a flu-like disease that infects 60 to 90 percent of
all Americans by adulthood. Its symptoms are so mild that it fre-
quently remains undiagnosed and is dangerous only to very young
infants and fetuses, or those with supressed immune systems (for
example, AIDS sufferers). 82 EBV is principally encountered as the
virus which causes infectious mononucleosis; it has also been linked
to two cancers, Burkitt's lymphoma and nasopharyngeal carcinoma,
but it is suspected that additional factors in the environment or the
victim are necessary for the cancers to develop.83
The most familiar virus in the herpes family is herpes simplex,
which occurs in two forms.8 4 Both are characterized by lesions, sim-
ilar to mosquito bites, that may appear anywhere on the body.85
Simplex I is particularly associated with common cold sores, and its
lesions usually appear above the waist. Simplex II usually produces
lesions below the waist. 86 Simplex II is also the usual cause of geni-
tal herpes,8 7 but genital herpes is nothing more than either simplex
virus present in the genital area.88 Simplex II is the usual cause
largely because of its tendency to appear below the waist. It is possi-
ble, however, for Simplex I to pass from the lips to the genitalia, or
for Simplex II to make the same trip in reverse.89 The symptomatic
lesions of both simplex strains appear inermittently, usually with de-
creasing frequency and severity as the patient ages. 90 Nearly fifty
percent of all children have been infected with one of the simplex
viruses by the age of five, and as many as seventy-five percent of all
adults carry it.91
80. MERCK, supra note 51, at 200; Washington Post, Jan. 13, 1985, at A18, col. 4.
81. MERCK, supra note 51, at 200.
82. Id. at 205-6. It is precisely because it is so common that CMV is not regarded as
a serious health problem. The Canadian Pediatric Society, for example, has recently
recognized that it would be medically unnecessary and inappropriate to bar children
with CMV from school. Committee on Infectious Diseases and Immunization, The Ca-
nadian Pediatric Society, Cytomegalovirus: An Occupational Hazard?, 131 CAN. MED. Assoc.
J. 730 (1984). A recent study of the percentage of American pre-schoolers with CVM
came to the same conclusion. Prevalence of Cytomegalovirus Excretion from Children in Five
Day-Care Centers - Alabama, 34 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 49, 49-51
(1985).
83. MERCK, supra note 51, at 202.
84. Washington Post, Jan. 13, 1985, at A18, col. 4.
85. Id.; MERCK, supra note 51, at 200-201.
86. MERCK, supra note 51, at 200-201.
87. Id. at 1629-30.
88. Iowa, supra note 79.
89. N.Y. Times, supra note 79.
90. Washington Post, Jan. 13, 1985, at A18, col. 4.
91. Ordeal, supra note 77; Iowa, supra note 79; Council Bluffs Educational Association
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Herpes simplex is rarely dangerous. The notable exceptions oc-
cur when the virus is contracted by an infant less than six weeks old
or by a sufferer of excema.92 In infants, whose undeveloped im-
mune systems are not able to control the disease, the effects can be
traumatic and the disease is frequently fatal.93 If the virus takes
hold in the eyes, it may eventually cause blindness. 94 Genital herpes
has been associated with an increased risk of cervical cancer.9 5
There is also a major risk of transmission to children during birth.9 6
For both sexes, genital herpes may have severe psychological ef-
fects, both because of the stigma attendant upon an incurable "ve-
nereal disease,"' 97 and because the disease's general symptoms of
malaise may be triggered and compounded by stress and weari-
ness.98 Estimates of the number of genital herpes cases in America
range from five to twenty million. 99
Simplex is not easily spread. The virus has to pass from an active
lesion to a new host through a mucus membrane, broken skin or an
open sore.' 00 Salivary transmission through coughing, biting or
sneezing may be possible, °'0 but is unusual: casual contact provides
little opportunity for transmission. 0 2 Intimate, and in particular
sexual contact, is about the only common activity likely to spread
herpes simplex. In the context of day to day social intercourse,
there is no such thing as a herpes epidemic.' 03
Early in 1985 three cases arose in which limitations were placed
on the school attendance of children infected with various forms of
herpes. The cases, in Pasadena, Maryland, Council Bluffs, Iowa,
and Sacramento, California, played out roughly the same scena-
rio. 10 4 This comment will focus on the Council Bluffs case. Baby
v. Council Bluffs Community School District, Civ. No. 84-66-W, slip op. at 2 (S.D. Iowa
Dec. 31, 1984); N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1985, §1, at 6, col. 1.
92. MERCK, supra note 51, at 200-201, 1805.
93. Id. at 1805-06.
94. Id. at 1994.
95. Id. at 1629-30.
96. Id. at 1805.
97. Note, Herpes - A Legal Cure - Can the Law Succeed Where Medicine has Failed?, 61 U.
DETROITJ. URB. L. 273, 278-9 (1984).
98. MERCK, supra note 51, at 200-201.
99. N.Y. Times, supra note 79; Washington Post, Jan. 13, 1985, at Al, col. 4.
100. MERCK, supra note 51, at 200-201; Are Schools Dangerous to Kids' Health? U.S.
NEWS AND WORLD REPORT 83 (Feb. 11, 1985); Washington Post, Jan. 10, 1985, at C7,
col. 5.
101. N.Y. Times, supra note 79.
102. Ordeal, supra note 77.
103. Council Bluffs, slip op. at 3-4; MERCK, supra note 51, at 200-201; N.Y. Times,
supra note 79.




Jane Doe's mother had arranged for her child to be admitted to a
special pre-school program organized under the EAHC.10 5 Like
many children whose infancy was marred by herpes, Baby Doe also
suffered from a learning disability which qualified her for special
pre-school education to prepare her for regular school.' 0 6 Appar-
ently Baby Doe contracted herpes shortly after birth from a cold
sore on her mother's lips.i ° 7 There was no evidence that either
mother or child had genital herpes.' 08 Having survived to school
age, Baby Doe was over the worst of her disease. 10 9 Her primary
remaining symptom was lesions that appeared at about five month
intervals in one of three places: her forearm, the outside thigh of
one leg, or her hands." 0 Other than their unusual location, her le-
sions were indistinguishable from ordinary cold sores, and no more
infectious. ' '
Initially, school officials had no difficulty admitting Baby Doe.
They understood that highly unusual contact would be required for
a child to transmit herpes. Such contact could be forestalled by a
minimal increase in teacher awareness." 2 There had been no spe-
cial concern about so mild, widespread and uncontagious a dis-
ease.' 13 Officials may have been aware of the general fear of genital
herpes, but it was regarded as irrelevant: genital herpes is a serious
disease, but it is not transmitted in pre-school classrooms by chil-
dren who do not have it.ii4 Initially, school officials' assessment of
risk conformed to available medical information, and their response
- a slight increase in teacher watchfulness - was medically sound.
Baby Doe's troubles began when news of her admission reached
the public. Teachers first sounded the alarm.ii 5 The reaction was
105. Council Bluffs, slip op. at 4-5; see also supra note 77.
106. N.Y. Times, supra note 79.
107. Iowa, supra note 79.
108. Council Bluffs, slip op. at 2.
109. N.Y. Times, supra note 79.
110. Council Bluffs, slip op. at 2.
111. N.Y. Times, supra note 79; Iowa, supra note 79.
112. Des Moines Register, Nov. 17, 1984, at 38, col. 1. In the Maryland case, the
Superintendent of Schools planned on "'taking the same precautions you would for any
common disease that is nonquarantinable." The only conditions he planned to place on
Johny Bigley's attendance were those routine for disease spread by contact with sores
(such as chicken pox): open sores were to be covered, or when, by reason of location,
they could not be covered, the child would be sent home for the duration of the out-
break. According to the Superintendent, this policy was, in fact, already applicable to
cold sores. Washington Post, Jan. 3, 1985, at C3, col. 1.
113. Council Bluffs, slip op. at 2.
114. N.Y. Times, supra note 79.
115. Council Bluffs Mother Files Suit in Herpes Case, Associated Press, Jan. 19, 1985
(press release available on NEXIS).
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stunning: "herpes" was a cry that created hysteria.''" Boycotts were
threatened, and the teachers' union filed suit to bar the child from
school.1 7 Based on an exaggerated fear of genital herpes, com-
pounded by ignorance of the different forms of herpes, and magni-
fied by a gross over-evaluation of the risk of transmission by casual
contact, teachers and parents were sure they and their children were
in real and imminent danger.'' 8 Neither the outcry by experts
across the country against this fear and its effects on the children
with herpes, nor the educational efforts of local health officials were
able to calm the parents and teachers." 19 Public health officials were
faced with the divergence between lay and medical thinking in its
purest form. Medical scientists assessed the risk of substantial harm
from the herpes children as extremely low. Some even pointed out
that childhood infection with herpes was normally far milder than
when the virus was contracted in adulthood. 20 As the public affairs
director of the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) put it, "[The con-
troversy] is built on a true foundation - the children do have
herpes. But it's all so colored by fears and misinformation."' 2' The
public's ignorance of herpes played a large role in its reaction, but
so did doctors' inability to guarantee that no child would ever be-
come seriously ill with a herpes infection contracted in school. Doc-
tors could only say that the probability of such an occurence was
very low. The public, however, evaluated the risk less in terms of
probability than possibility.' 22 As one mother in Maryland put it,
"We're scared that [our son] will be the one-in-a-million child that
will come down with something that will harm him."' 2 3 Such a risk
assessment would justify virtually any restriction on the victim, no
matter how small the empirical increase in security it provided -
even if that security were purely psychological. The most effective
116. Iowa, supra note 79.
117. Des Moines Register, Nov. 17, 1984, at 3, col. 1; Washington Post,Jan. 8, 1985,
at BI, col. 1; Ordeal, supra note 77. In Maryland, teachers were so worried about conta-
gion that they demanded a lifetime job guarantee for teachers infected in the line of
duty, and indemnification for teachers sued because of classroom transmission. Wash-
ington Post, Jan. 5, 1985, at B3, col. 1.
118. N.Y. Times, supra note 79; Ordeal, supra note 77. Judge O'Brien's repeated dis-
missal of the issue of genital herpes in the Council Bluffs case demonstrates how con-
cerned he was with the public's anxieties. He correctly stated, "a teacher would have to
somehow have physical contact with the herpes virus on the teacher's genitals before the
teacher could get genital herpes .. " Council Bluffs, slip op. at 2,3.
119. Iowa, supra note 79; Ordeal, supra note 77.
120. Ordeal, supra note 77.
121. N.Y. Times, supra note 79.
122. Kasper, supra note 15; Slovic, Fischoff & Lichtenstein, Facts and Fears: Under-
standing Perceived Risk, in SOCIETAL RISK ASSESSMENT 181 (1980).




response under such an analysis is one which assures no contact at
all, namely total isolation of the diseased child.
Such was the goal of the Council Bluffs Education Association
whcn it sought a preliminary injunction against Baby Doe's enroll-
ment from the Federal District Court. 24 After a two-day hearing,
1 25
Judge Donald O'Brien issued a decision allowing the child to enroll
but ordering that Baby Doe's mother must examine her for lesions
and/or fever every morning and take her child to school personally;
she was not to ride the school bus. Before mingling with other chil-
dren at school, Baby Doe was required to be examined again for
lesions and fever by both her mother and the school nurse or his
designee. If lesions were present at any stage, Baby Doe was to re-
main at home until they healed. This was to apply to all children
with herpetic lesions, including cold sores. Each child in the class
had to be examined daily for lesions. "All this is to be done as dis-
creetly as possible and without any fanfare."' 126
In the other herpes cases, the results were remarkably similar. In
Maryland, county Judge Eugene Lerner, following Judge O'Brien,
required a daily nurse check, and barred the child, Johny Bigley,
from the school bus. He followed the local school's original plan by
not barring Johny if his lesions could be covered, and somehow
thought up the idea of having Johny wear a one-piece jumpsuit
when he had lesions on his back. Any lesions on his hands, how-
ever, coverable or not, would require Johny to stay home. Then,
because Johny might get lesions on his "diaper area," the judge or-
dered that the boy's diapers be changed in a separate room, not
used by children, by an official wearing a disposable gown and
gloves. Finally, Johny was to have a designated set of playthings
reserved for his sole use, to be disinfected at the end of each day.' 27
In Sacramento, where the child in question had CMV, school offi-
cials agreed to equip restrooms "with more soap and towels to de-
crease the risk of spreading the disease, keep other children from
touching the boy's food and tray, and minimize his playground con-
tact with other children."'128
There are obvious problems with these orders. One is hard put to
124. Council Bluffs, slip op. at 1.
125. In addition to extensive medical testimony, there was evidence that exclusion
from the classroom would substantially harm Baby Doe's intellectual and social develop-
ment. Moreover, the placement of the child in the classroom was in full conformity with
the requirements of the EAHC and Iowa's parallel State Plan. Id. at 4-5.
126. Id. at 7-8.
127. Washington Post, Jan. 10, 1985, at Cl, col. 2: Id.,Jan 13. 1985, at A19, col. 1.
128. First Day of Herpes Check Turns Up Nothing, United Press International, Jan. 16,
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envision a nurse examining a classroom full of preschoolers for
herpes lesions "discretely . . . and without any fanfare." In Iowa,
children with the common cold sore, who have been trooping off to
school as long as there have been schools, are now to be barred
from school not because people are afraid of cold sores, but to jus-
tify the exclusion of a child whose sores, while not on the lip, are of
the same viral type, and, where they are covered by clothing, proba-
bly less transmissible. 29 In Sacramento, a child's playground con-
tact with other children is to be "minimized" despite the fact that his
disease is so common that his classmates' chances of getting it are
virtually unaffected by the restriction.13 0 In Maryland, Johny Bigley
is required to wear a special playsuit. In both Maryland and Iowa,
children who may get lesions as rarely as once in a school year are
barred permanently from riding the school bus. None of these pre-
cautions is more than marginally justified by the medical facts, if at
all.' 3 ' But these problems should not obscure more fundamental
errors in the decisions.
These cases are examples of the health decision-making process
breaking down both in the evaluation of risk and the selection of
response. Judge O'Brien's opinion in the Council Bluffs case recog-
nizes that the risk of herpes transmission had been assessed as very
slight, justifying only the most minimal limitations, if any, on Baby
Doe's attendance:
One of the doctors who testified stated that he had written the guide-
lines on how to handle herpes children . . . and that, while he had
written the guidelines recommending that any child with herpes who
had active lesions should remain out of school until the lesions healed,
he personally felt that was a very conservative statement and that if he
had a child in the same class, he would not object if the child with
active herpes lesions stayed in the class if said lesions were covered. '
32
The physicians who were called upon to make the risk assessment,
the simple determination of the problem posed by Baby Doe's
herpes in the school setting, failed, however, to exclude the public's
frightened reaction from consideration. Judge O'Brien in turn
failed to demand an untainted risk assessment. 33 The improper
1985 (press release available on NEXIS); Herpes Girl, Associated Press, Jan. 16, 1985
(press release available on NEXIS).
129. See supra notes 92-103 and accompanying text.
130. Canadian Pediatric Society, supra note 82; Prevalence, supra note 82.
131. See supra notes 109-114 and accompanying text.
132. Council Bluffs, slip op. at 3.
133. An assessment may be tested, as in Carey, by weighing opposing evidence, see




mixing of medical and public assessments of risk, which rendered
the resulting assessment useless as a standard by which all could
debate the more open question of response, is clear in this passage
of the opinion:
The physician who had inspected Baby Jane Doe on two or three occa-
sions said that her history showed that she had these lesions periodi-
cally and that they were active for about four days. He further
recommended that she should be kept out of school during that period
even though there is no real reason to isolate Baby Jane Doe on a scientific basis,
but that it is desirable on a social basis because possible contact with
herpes or the mention of it usually creates such an emotional situation
as to require that the child be segregated based only on social considera-
tions. (emphasis added) 134
Here is a judge adopting the political advice of a physician testifying
as a medical expert. This is precisely the kind of mistake the strict
requirement of a purely medical risk assessment is supposed to pre-
vent. If there was no medical basis for isolating Baby Doe when her
lesions were active but could be covered, there was no legal basis for
doing so. If there was no adequate showing of necessity on the basis
of a proper risk assessment, responses should not even have been
considered. The herpes cases are simply the Grube case recast in a
tougher setting; doctors, under pressure, begin to substitute "phi-
losophy" or, in this case, "sociology," for medical data in their judg-
ments. The only difference is that here the courts allowed it.
It may be that some precautions were justified, but it is not possi-
ble to evaluate responses with a tainted and virtually standardless
risk assessment. As a result, the courts' decisions were not only
wrong as law - they also failed to deal effectively with the public
health problem. The courts saddled school officials and themselves
with the enforcement of excessive regulations that are burdensome,
hard to justify and bad precedent. Ironically, public anxiety was not
significantly reduced:' 35 decisions such as this validate the public
perception of crisis. Worst of all, the children and their parents
were injured by potentially stigmatizing, costly, and educationally
damaging restrictions. Had the courts in these cases applied the
proper standards - had, for example, Judge O'Brien excluded im-
explicit presence of impermissible factors in the assessment. See infra note 134 and ac-
companying text.
134. Council Bluffs, slip op. at 4 (emphasis added).
135. In Maryland and Iowa City, boycotts continued for weeks after the decision,
and some parents were speaking of moving their children to new schools or the entire
family to new school districts. Teachers Check School Kids for Herpes, United Press Interna-
tional,Jan. 15, 1985 (press release available on NEXIS); First Day of Herpes Check Turns Up
Nothing, United Press International, Jan. 16, 1985 (press release available on NEXIS).
503
Yale Law & Policy Review
proper medical testimony on the social wisdom of isolating Baby
Jane Doe, and based his decision on a strictly medical risk assess-
ment as the courts did in Carey or Grube - the law would have been
far better served. Health officials would have had a firm basis for
adopting more limited and practical responses without decreasing
the actual amount of protection to Baby Doe's classmates, and pub-
lic fears would have been far more sensibly addressed. An authori-
tative body following strict rules of evidence would have publicly
evaluated the risk as minimal and scrutinized the state's responses.
The courts' orders treated fear as the problem to be eliminated,
rather than as a key complicating factor. As a result, their decisions
mischaracterized or inadequately responded to the medical prob-
lem, undermining the purposes for which the engine of public
health was started. Common sense, which has at least this role in
medical questions, tells us that the results of the herpes suits would
be silly were it not for the cost to the victims. These costs, however,
point out the injustice of public health law incorrectly applied -
victims of disease were burdened and mistreated out of all propor-
tion to the health threat they posed.
III. The Battle of the Bathhouses
The disease now known as Acquired Immunodeficiency Syn-
drome was first identified as a distinct medical entity in 1981.136
AIDS' symptoms are other diseases; it kills by proxy.' 37 It now ap-
pears that AIDS itself is caused by a virus' 38 which undermines the
immune system, leaving the body biologically defenseless against
disease.' 39 The prognosis for an AIDS patient is grim; the disease
136. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES: U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SER-
VICE, FACTS ABOUT AIDS 1 (1985) [hereinafter FACTS]. At first, AIDS was simply re-
ferred to as "Karposi's sarcoma and opportunistic infections in previously healthy
persons." Then, as both its immune system supression and its disproportionate impact
on gays were noted, many adopted the acronym "GRID", for "Gay-related immune defi-
ciency." "AIDS" was finally adopted in 1982, as the broader dimensions of the disease
became clearer. Update on Karposi's Sarcoma and Opportunistic Infections in Previously Healthy
Persons, 31 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 294 (1982); Black, The Plague
Years, ROLLING STONE 48, 117 (Mar. 28, 1985).
137. FACTS, supra note 136, at 1.
138. The virus has been variously named by its competing discoverers in France and
the United States LAV-I, HTLV-1II and ARV. Council on Scientific Affairs, Acquired In-
munodeficiency Syndrome, 252 J.A.M.A. 2037,2038 (1984); San Francisco Chronicle, Dec.
15, 1984, at 5, col. 1.
139. Council on Scientific Affairs, supra note 138; Batchelor, AIDS: A Public Health
and Psychological Emergency, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1279, 1280 (1984). The virus affects
cellular organs called T-lymphocytes, which take the form of either helper T cells or
supressor T cells. Helper T cells work with other immune cells to fight bacterial and




appears to be uniformly fatal. About half of the reported victims
have already died. 140
While there remains much to learn about AIDS, physicians are
confident that their general knowledge of viral infection informs
their understanding of AIDS' spread. According to Dr. Mervyn
Silverman, San Francisco's former health director, "even though we
don't have all the answers, the disease didn't come from outer
space. We know about disease processes."' 4 1 AIDS is often com-
pared to hepatitis B, whose etiology is well understood. 142 In the
same way as Hepatitis B, 14 3 AIDS is spread by transfer of bodily
fluids, principally semen and blood. 144  Both may occur in the
course of homosexual, and also heterosexual, sex, 14 5 in the sharing
of hypodermic needles1 4 6 or during blood transfusions. 4 7 In addi-
tion, mothers may pass the disease to their children at birth.14 8
Some sort of intimate contact is probably always necessary to spread
the disease: salivary and other forms of casual or airborne transmis-
sion are regarded as highly unlikely.14 9
number of helper T cells is seriously reduced. Council on Scientific Affairs, supra note
138, at 2037. The two most common diseases that afflict the AIDS victim are Karposi's
sarcoma, a rare form of cancer, and pneumocystis cainii pneumonia. Instead of, or in
addition to these, many victims suffer and even die from an array of opportunistic infec-
tions which are rarely serious in the general population. FACTS, supra note 136, at 1. For
example, forms of herpes such as CVM, Simplex and Epstein-Barr, are common, and
commonly fatal, in AIDS patients. Update on Karposi's Sarcoma, supra note 136; Update on
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) - United States, 32 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY
WEEKLY REPORT 465,466 (1983). New research suggests that the virus may directly act
upon the brain, causing severe dementia in a substantial percentage of cases. Battling
AIDS, TIME 68 (April 29, 1985).
140. Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) - United States, 33 MORBIDITY
AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 661 (1984).
141. Epidemic of Fear, supra note 1, §2 (The World), at 13.
142. See, e.g., LaRocca v. Dalsheim, 120 Misc. 2d 697, 467 N.Y.S. 2d 302, 308 (1983);
Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS): Precautions for Health-Care Workers and Allied Pro-
fessionals, 32 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 450, 451 (1983).
143. See supra note 51.
144. Batchelor, supra note 139, at 1279.
145. Council on Scientific Affairs, supra note 138, at 2041.
146. FACTS, supra note 136, at 1.
147. Boston Globe, April 17, 1985, at 14, col. 1.
148. Council on Scientific Affairs, supra note 138, at 2040-4 1.
149. Battling AIDS, supra note 139. Studies have detected the virus in the saliva and
tears of AIDS carriers, but transmission via either fluid is thought to be highly unlikely,
since the virus cannot enter a host body except through broken skin or mucous mem-
branes. AIDS: The Saliva Scare, NEWSWEEK 103 (Oct. 22, 1984); AIDS Update, 3 CONNECT-
ICUT EPIDEMIOLOGIST 19,20 (1985); N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1985, at 6, col. 4. Even before
the virus was discovered, the CDC regarded airborne spread as a highly unlikely possi-
bility. Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) Update - United States, 32 MORBIDITY AND
MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 309, 310-11 (1983).
Originally, the disease was confined to members of four high risk groups: sexually
active gay men, intravenous (IV) drug abusers, hemophiliacs and recent Haitian immi-
grants. Id. Haitians were removed from the list. N.Y. Times, April 10, 1985, at A13,
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Two elements particularly complicate the task of monitoring and
preventing the spread of AIDS. The first is the long incubation pe-
riod of the disease, which is at least six months but may be thirty-six
months or even longer.' 50 This results both in a long lag time in the
reporting of cases, and a long period of time in which an infectious
victim may be sexually active without any indication, to himself or
his partners, that he has the disease. The second is the existence of
a related syndrome referred to as either pre-AIDS, AIDS Related
Complex (ARC) or lymphadenopathy. 15 1 Its symptoms are less se-
vere than AIDS, and it is more likely a successful defeat of AIDS
than an early stage. Nevertheless, it is equally incurable, and its vic-
tims may carry and transmit the AIDS virus to others, less able to
fight it off. 152 By the end ofJuly, 1985, there had been over 12,000
reported cases of AIDS, and it is feared that both AIDS and ARC are
spreading fast.' 5 3 The CDC expects the number of cases to double
in 1985 alone, and AIDS caseload of forty to one hundred thousand
patients is not unlikely in the next few years.' 54
col. 1. Hemophiliacs, it was quickly understood, probably picked up the virus from
transfusions of contaminated blood, and were at high risk only because of the frequency
with which they required transfusions. Council on Scientific Affairs, supra note 138, at
2041; Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome in Persons with Hemophilia, 33 MORBIDITY
AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 589, 590-91 (1984). There are now many confirmed
cases of transmission to non-hemophiliacs via infected blood. Boston Globe, supra note
147. Heterosexual transmission is becoming a serious problem among prostitutes and
sexual partners of IV drug abusers. Battling AIDS, supra note 139; San Francisco Chroni-
cle, Nov. 14, 1984, at 4, col. 1.
There is little question that AIDS is not an intrinsically male disease - one third of
France's victims are women, San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 5, 1985, at 10, col. 1, as are
forty percent of Belgium's as compared with seven percent in the United States. Council
on Scientific Affairs, supra note 138, at 2037-38. A San Francisco health official has
urged that promiscuous heterosexuals be designated an AIDS risk group in that city.
Wall St.J., Apr. 18, 1985, at 22, col. 3.
150. Council on Scientific Affairs, supra note 138, at 2041.
151. Id. at 2037; N.Y. Times, May 16, 1985, at A19, col. 1.
152. San Francisco Chronicle, Dec. 9, 1984, at BI, col. 5. Some researchers believe
that as many as 20 % of ARC victims will go on to develop AIDS. AIDS: A Growing
Threat, TIME 40, 42 (Aug. 12, 1985).
153. AIDS: A Growing Threat, TIME 40, 42 (Aug. 12, 1985). In 1984, the number of
reported cases increased at a rate of 74 % compared with 1983. Update: Acquired Immu-
nodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) - United States, 33 MoRBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY RE-
PORT 661, 663 (1984).
154. A 1985 report commissioned by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) esti-
mated that more than four hundred thousand people may have been infected with the
AIDS virus. The Waterbury Republican, Feb. 21, 1985, at C12, col. 2. Not all of these
people will get the disease, but in limited follow-up studies for periods ranging from one
to five years, 4 to 19 per cent of those exposed were found to have developed AIDS.
Only two months later, a new estimate of one million infected Amereicans emerged
from a CDC AIDS conference. Battling AIDS, supra note 139. Based on the NIH study,




CDC and state health department guidelines for hospitals and
schools presented with AIDS patients, developed by and large
outside the glare of publicity, make it clear that a few simple precau-
tions serve to all but eliminate any risk of transmission. 155 Since
AIDS is transmitted via body fluids, the guidelines primarily cover
treatment of blood and open sores. In general, they are the same
precautions, for example wearing gloves when handling patient
blood, taken for any patient who has a blood-transmissible disease
such as hepatitis. ' 56 That these guidelines are effective is shown by
the lack of AIDS cases in medical personnel in direct contact with
AIDS patients, including those who have been accidentally stuck by
needles used on AIDS patients. 157 AIDS, despite its severe effects
and the mystery it retains, is controllable, and virulent primarily
under identifiable and avoidable circumstances. AIDS is a severe
problem, but it is not a modern version of the Black Death.
The public response to AIDS has changed as its incidence has
spread beyond the initial high risk groups. At first, those members
of the public who did not belong to any of the high risk groups
tended not to fear AIDS. It was a "Gay Plague."' 158 As AIDS has
begun to spread to heterosexuals through blood products, however,
both public attention and public fear have increased.' 59 While
AIDS is far rarer than herpes, far rarer than even genital herpes, 160
its high mortality rate makes it as real and serious a public health
threat as herpes is an overreaction.' 6 ' Enough is known about AIDS
to assess it as a major public health risk. But, as responses are con-
sidered, uncertainty as to the disease's etiology may be magnified in
lay minds; health officials, in turn, may be unwilling to choose medi-
cally justified responses which ask the public to accept too much sci-
entific uncertainty. When one considers how difficult it proved for
officials and courts to adhere to strictly medical standards in the
case of herpes, one can readily imagine even greater difficulty in
155. Precautions for Health-Care Workers and Allied Professionals, supra note 142, at 19-21.
156. Id.
157. AIDS Update, supra note 149, at 20; Update: Prospective Evaluation of Health Care
Workers Exposed via the Parental or Mucous-Membrane Route to Blood or Body Fluids from Parents
with Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome - United States, 34 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY
WEEKLY REPORT 101. 101-3 (1985).
158. Black, supra note 136, at 121.
159. Batchelor, supra note 139, at 1288. A September, 1985, New York Times/CBS
News poll found that 51 % of Americans ranked AIDS as one of the top three health
threats, along with cancer and heart disease. N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1985, at BI 1, col. 1.
160. See supra notes 77, 99, 152 and accompanying text.
161. FACTS, supra note 136, at 1.
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anti-AIDS health actions.' 62
AIDS struck San Francisco hard. Proportionally, the city has the
highest gay population in the country, and, proportional to its pop-
ulation, the highest rate of AIDS. 163 By early 1984, new cases of
AIDS were being reported at the rate of one or two a day. 16 4 As the
mechanism of sexual transmission became clear, it was hard for
many people to ignore the bathhouses, cinemas and book stores
that served as sexual meeting places for the city's gays. 16 5 The bath-
houses had a special meaning for San Francisco's gays. 1 6 They
were an important part of a brave new world in which a sexuality
that had been hidden could thrive openly and proudly. They were
among the most visible manifestations of gay power and freedom in
San Francisco.' 6 7 To some extent the term "bathhouse" is a misno-
mer; the "baths" were really a hybrid of restaurants, gymnasiums,
cinemas and bars. But they were designed, built and promoted as
sexual pleasure domes. They offered individuals the opportunity
and special equipment necessary for frequent, anonymous sexual
encounters, often involving many men at once.'"6 While this kind of
sex was arguably evidence of gay liberation, many people, both gay
and straight, were convinced that it was also spreading death by
AIDS, and began to consider ways to close the bathhouses.' 69
In contrast to the herpes children, gays in San Francisco were a
self-conscious and politically organized minority able to assert their
162. Public information is regarded as essential in the battle against AIDS and fear
of AIDS. In its guidelines for hospital AIDS management, for example, the American
Hospital Association deals with the fear produced by AIDS and the risk this poses to
adequate medical care for the victim. Some hospitals have been severely disrupted by
the arrival of AIDS patients, with other patients, service personnel and even doctors
boycotting. "Intensive efforts at education and crisis intervention by skilled, knowedge-
able [sic], and respected hospital personnel are perhaps the most useful activities to ensure
that a hospital continues to function adequately when an AIDS patient is present."
American Hospital Association, A Hospitalwide Approach to AIDS 3 (Dec. 1984) (re-
leased by State of New York, Department of Health, Office of Public Health).
The magnitude of the public information problem is suggested by a poll which found
that, "About half the American people believe AIDS can be transmitted through casual
contact despite what Federal scientists say is overwhelming evidence to the contrary."
N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1985, at B 11, col. 1; and see Results ofa Gallup Poll on Acquired Immu-
nodeficiency Syndrome - New York City, United States, 1985, 34 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY
WEEKLY REPORT 513 (1985).
163. San Francisco Chronicle, Dec. 13, 1984, at 1, col. 3.
164. L.A. Times, Oct. 18, 1984, at 1, col. 1,30; San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 3,
1984, at 4, col. 1.
165. Politics and the Bathhouses, San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 15, 1984, §2 (The
World), at 15, 16; San Francisco Chronicle, Mar. 28, 1984, at 1, col. 2.
166. San Francisco Chronicle, Nov. 11, 1984, at 4, col. I.
167. L.A. Times, supra note 164, at 31, col. 1.
168. Id.




rights in the political as well as the judicial arena. Gays were already
encumbered or threatened by many legal and social restrictions, and
they scrutinized health action against AIDS in that light. 170 There
was, in fact, considerable resistance on the part of many gay leaders
and political organizations to any action against the bathhouses.
For these parties, the symbolism of the baths, and, perhaps even
more importantly, the negative implications of any public limita-
tions on the gay life and privacy, outweighed the risk of AIDS trans-
mission. 17  On an intuitive level, gays suspected the motives of
those who claimed to have their safety at heart. As one psychologist
wrote, "gay men are now asked to appraise in a positive and trusting
manner the same recommendations for behavioral change that were
only recently offered for transparently negative reasons."1 72 A San
Francisco gay political leader put it differently: "[Checking on bath-
house sex] reminds us of the way things were when vice cops spied
on toilets. There is a very strong reaction to this."'' 73 Many gays
were understandably afraid that AIDS might be used as a pretext for
oppression and discrimination. 174
Proponents of closure, including Mayor Diane Feinstein, gay City
Supervisor Harry Britt and most physicians involved in treating and
researching AIDS in San Francisco, were cautious. They believed
that the bathhouses were spreading AIDS and should close, but
wanted to avoid government action that might be perceived as anti-
gay. 175 Resources were directed towards public education efforts, in
the hope that the danger posed by the bathhouses would be amelio-
170. Joseph, Coping with the Threat of AIDS, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1297 (1984); L.A.
Times, supra note 164.
171. Wall St.J., Feb. 8, 1985, at 23, col. 4.
172. Joseph, supra note 170, at 1300.
173. L.A. Times, supra note 164, at 30, col. 1.
174. There have been indications that some state governments are using the spectre
of AIDS as a public health justification for reviving moribund sodomy laws. AIDS - A
New Reason to Regulate Homosexuality, supra note 2. Although these attempts have not al-
ways been successful, see, e.g., Baker v. Wade, No. CA 3-79-1434-R, slip op. (N.D. Tex.
Apr. 3, 1984), supplementing, 533 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982), appeal dismissed, 743 F.
2d 236 (5th Cir. 1982), there have been numerous cases ofjob and housing discrimina-
tion against gays as both actual and potential victims of AIDS. Flaherty, A Legal Emer-
gency Brewing Over AIDS, Nat'l L. J., July 9, 1984, at 1, 44; Comment, supra note 64.
Recently, Colorado's Health Department decided to begin a list of all people who test
positive for the AIDS virus. N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1985, at 24, col. 1. The Defense
Department has announced that it will screen all new recruits for AIDS, which some gay
activists regard as "a surrogate marker to identify gays." Trying to Lock Out AIDS, NEWS-
WEEK 65 (Sept. 16, 1985). There are some neutral justifications for screening - for
example the high cost of treating AIDS victims - but there are also legitimate concerns
about the reliability and possible misuse of the test data, as well as widespread adoption
of such screening in the private sector. Id.; N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1985, at I, col. 4.
175. See supra note 165; Wall St.J., Feb. 8, 1985, at 23, col. 4.
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rated through either greater indulgence in safe gay sex (sex, that is,
in which transmission of infectious bodily fluids is avoided by the
use of condoms and abstention from oral sex) or the closing of bath-
houses for want of patrons.' 76 There was a decline in bathhouse
patronage after the initial AIDS scare in the summer of 1983, and
some bathhouses did close, but by early 1984, attendance, and
AIDS, were on the rise. 177
The figure at the center of the bathhouse debate was Dr. Mervyn
Silverman, city health commissioner. Though he regarded AIDS as
the most serious public health problem he had ever faced, he ini-
tially doubted the effectiveness and legality of closing the bath-
houses.178 The nature of the parties and the disease involved in the
bathhouse controversy made the issue extremely sensitive. While
Silverman, as a public health official, was required to make a deci-
sion based on medical grounds, that does not mean he was barred
from an awareness of the political realities. Had he developed a
medically justified plan with broad community support and partici-
pation, he might have avoided significant political and legal opposi-
tion. Similarly, better efforts to produce a consensus plan might
have led to effective voluntary action by the concerned parties. In
the year preceding his decision to close the bathhouses, however,
Silverman, unsure of his position, managed to alienate virtually
everyone.
The starting point in the controversy over closure was the reluc-
tance of anyone to do anything. The impasse was broken in March,
1984, when a gay activist named Larry Littlejohn announced a peti-
tion drive to place a proposition on the November ballot that would
have forced the city to close the bathhouses. 79 Gay leaders recog-
nized that such a proposition might develop into a potentially disas-
trous referendum on homosexuality; an administrative closing for
health reasons was by far the lesser evil.' 80 Within forty-eight hours
of Littlejohn's announcement, Silverman was presented with a letter
signed by dozens of gay leaders urging him to close the bath-
houses.' 8 1 The city attorney assured Silverman he had the legal au-
176. San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 9, 1984, at 4, col. 5.
177. San Francisco Chronicle, supra note 164; L.A. Times, supra note 164, at 31, col.
I.
178. San Francisco Chronicle, supra note 164; Politics and the Bathhouses, supra note
165, at 15.
179. San Francisco Chronicle, Mar. 28, 1984, at 1, col. 2.
180. San Francisco Chronicle, Mar. 29, 1984, at 2, col. 5.




thority to close the bathhouses. 8 2 Closure was supported by the
Mayor, the straight political leadership and the medical commu-
nity.' 83 Silverman called a news conference at which, he said, a clos-
ing order would be announced, but at the very last minute he
changed his mind, claiming medical and legal doubts.8 4 This was
probably the last chance for action supported by all the key parties.
In the general reaction of outrage, the fragile coalition
splintered. 85
Two weeks later, Silverman banned sexual activity in the bath-
houses.' 86 His position was now that dangerous bathhouse sex was
contributing to the spread of AIDS, but that available medical evi-
dence might not be enough to justify closure to a court.' 87 In order
to obtain the means to enforce the ban, he spent the next several
months trying to have the authority to license the bathhouses
shifted from the police department to the health department. 88
Dissatisfaction with his performance and the impending arrival of
the 1984 democratic convention combined to kill his proposal in
committee.' 89 By August, it was clear that his ban had accomplished
nothing, while squandering great amounts of human and political
energy.
Silverman's next move was an undercover investigation, which, to
no one's surprise, revealed that unsafe sexual activity conducive to
the spread of AIDS was continuing in the bathhouses. 90 On Octo-
ber 9, 1984, convinced that AIDS was being spread in the bath-
houses, convinced that he finally had the medical evidence to prove
it,'19 and willing to rely on his own power under the state health
code,' 92 Silverman ordered the closing of fourteen establishments
where investigators had observed unsafe sex.' 93 Upon the refusal of
182. Id.
183. Id.; San Francisco Chronicle, supra note 180.
184. San Francisco Chronicle, Mar. 31, 1984, at 1, col. 2. At this time, the City At-
torney still maintained that Silverman had it in his power to close the bathhouses, but, a
few days later, he retreated from that position. San Francisco Chronicle, Apr. 5, 1984, at
2, col. 5.
185. San Francisco Chronicle, Mar. 31, 1984, at 1, col. 2.
186. N.Y. Times, April 10, 1984, at A14, col. 6.
187. Id.; San Francisco Chronicle, Dec. 12, 1984, at 1, col. 8; id. June 2, 1984, at 12,
col. 1.
188. San Francisco Chronicle, May 25, 1984, at 5, col. 1; id. June 2, 1984, at 12, col.
1; id. June 12, 1984, at 5, col. 4; id. July 18, 1984, at 12, col. 1.
189. San Francisco Chronicle, June 15, 1984, at 6, col. 1; id. Aug. 10, 1984, at 2, col.
4.
190. San Francisco Chronicle, Oct. 12, 1984, at 2, col. 5.
191. Id.; L.A. Times, Oct. 10, 1984, at 1, col. 3.
192. San Francisco Chronicle, Nov. 14, 1984, at 4, col. 2.
193. San Francisco Chronicle, Oct. 10, 1984, at 1, col. 1. The businesses closed
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several owners to obey his order, Silverman sought an injunction in
the Superior Court.' 9
4
After a long ride in the political arena, the decision to close the
bathhouses was now to be decided in a court, under the health
law.195 The court had to make two determinations: risk - was bath-
house sex contributing to the spread of AIDS - and response -
was closing the bathhouses the least restrictive, medically effective
solution. No one seriously disputed that AIDS was being spread in
the bathhouse. 96 Battle was joined on the second question. The
city argued that closure was a justifiable response to the risk of AIDS
transmission in the bathhouses because of the severity of the risk
and the failure of less drastic, voluntary measures. 197 The bath-
house owners replied with two arguments. First, they asserted that
the constitutional privacy doctrine prohibited any regulation of ac-
tivities in private bathhouse cubicles. Second, they maintained that,
given both the nature of the risk and the importance of the privacy
rights involved, closure was too extreme a means to regulate activity
in the open areas of the bathhouses. Instead, they suggested a plan
to ban high risk sex in public areas, with enforcement insured by
improved lighting, employee monitoring of patrons, and random
health department checks. They also offered to pass out "I like safe
sex" stickers to patrons.' 98
The owners' privacy argument was intended to trigger a strict
scrutiny of the city's action, and to convince the judge that the cost
to individual rights of closing the bathhouses was greater than the
benefit to society.' 99 Such a cost/benefit analysis, however, is inap-
propriate except as a measure of the restrictiveness of the response.
Jacobson states that individual rights may be abridged where neces-
included several adult bookstores and movie theaters where unsafe sex had been
observed.
194. A temporary restraining order was issued, closing the bathhouses, but, because
of First Amendment protections, not the bookstores and cinemas. N.Y. Times, Nov. 29,
1984, at A26, col. 1. The bookstores and theaters were, however, ordered to prevent
sex in public areas. L.A. Times, Oct. 16, 1984, at 20, col. 1.
195. The issue before the court was whether or not to issue a preliminary injunction
closing the bathhouses pending a full trial. California ex rel. Agnost v. Owen, No. 830
321, slip op. (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 30, 1984).
196. San Francisco Chronicle, Oct. 12, 1984, at 2, col. 5; id. Oct. 16, 1984, at 2, col.
1; id. Nov. 14, 1984, at 4, col. 2.
197. San Francisco Chronicle, Dec. 21, 1984, at 2, col. 1; L.A. Times, supra note 164.
198. San Francisco Chronicle, Oct. 15, 1984, at 3, col. 1; id. Nov. 14, 1984, at 4, col.
2.





sary to protect the public.200 The risk of transmission having been
established, privacy became simply another right the state might
sweep away.
The owners' alternative response asserted the medical inadequacy
and excessive restrictiveness of closure. As in Carey,20' the rights
asserted were important enough for the court to undertake its own
fact-finding; but, also as in Carey, the court could overturn the city's
action only upon a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that
it was not medically justified.202 The owners bore the burden of
showing not only that their proposal was reasonable and might
work, but also that it was both less restrictive and more medically
appropriate that the city's. The owners attempted to meet this bur-
den with two arguments. First, the owners claimed that closure did
not address the real problem, which was not bathhouses, but dan-
gerous sexual activity, which would continue with or without bath-
houses. 20 3 This was the position taken by public health officials in
other AIDS-beset cities, and was premised on a view that bathhouse
patrons represented a sexual hard-core who would continue their
activity even if the bathhouses closed.20 4 The owners' second claim
followed from this, though with less than convincing logic: bath-
houses, as the loci of unsafe sex, presented an ideal forum for edu-
cating those most in need of education, a forum that would be lost if
the activity was diffused throughout the community.20 5 Obviously,
the two arguments together required the court to accept that bath-
house patrons are at the same time incorrigible and educable. Nev-
ertheless, neither argument can be dismissed out of hand.
The city, however, had strong medical backing and legitimate
counter-arguments.20 6 In all likelihood, closure would have re-
200. The Court wrote that "[u]pon the principle of self-defense, of paramount ne-
cessity, a community has the right to protect itself against an epidemic of disease which
threatens the safety of its members." 197 U.S. 11, 27. Steps that might infringe upon
individual rights were justified by the principle that liberty, "does not impart an absolute
ight in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from re-
straint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for
the common good." 197 U.S. 11, 26.
201. New York State Association for Retarded Children, Inc. v Carey, 612 F.2d 644
(2d Cir. 1979).
202. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
203. San Francisco Chronicle, Nov. 14, 1984, at 4, col. 2; id. Oct. 16, 1984, at 2, col.
I.
204. L.A. Times, supra note 164, at 1; Wall St.J., supra note 171.
205. L.A. Times, supra note 164, at 1; San Francisco Chronicle, Nov. 14, 1984, at 4,
col. 2.
206. San Francisco Chronicle, Oct. 12, 1984, at 2, col. 5; id. Oct. 10, 1984, at 1, col.
1; id. Sept. 5, 1984, at 6, col. 4. It is clear, as the CDC has written, that, "In the absence
of an available vaccine or specific therapy for the treatment of AIDS, broad-scale preven-
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duced dangerous activity. An informal health department survey
conducted before closure found that forty-seven percent of patrons
questioned would not alter their activity if the bathhouses closed,
but that thirty-five percent would either reduce or eliminate the ac-
tivity altogether.20 7 It was not necessary that the city completely
stop unsafe sex; stopping unsafe sex only in facilities it licensed and
over which it could reasonably exercise control was a legitimate city
goal. Furthermore, while some indices suggested that education
campaigns had successfully reduced the level of unsafe sex in San
Francisco, these efforts had not been concentrated in bathhouses
and were, presumably, least successful among men who still fre-
quented them. 208 Finally, a major element in evaluating the medical
effectiveness of the two responses was enforceability. The city
claimed that a voluntary or owner-policed system would not
work. 20 9 It was questionable whether owners would be willing or
able effectively to supervise the sex acts of consenting adult custom-
ers.210 Certainly, the task posed far more problems than checking a
classroom of pre-schoolers for herpes lesions. Given these counter-
arguments, the owners failed to meet their burden of proof. They,
like the plaintiff in Jacobson, merely asserted that some people dis-
agreed with what the city chose to do. They failed to attack the risk
assessment, or convincingly show, as in Carey, that the response was
neither medically effective nor least restrictive.
Nevertheless, Judge Roy L. Wonder's decision lifted the re-
straining order and allowed the bathhouses to operate under the
following restrictions. 21' The owners were required to hire for
every twenty patrons one monitor, whose job would be to check sex-
ual activity every ten minutes and eject patrons engaging in unsafe
tion and control activities must revolve around risk reduction and programs that posi-
tively affect behavioral changes and reduce transmission of [AIDS] infection." Results of
a Gallup Poll on Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome - New York City, United States, 1985, 34
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 513 (1985).
207. L.A. Times, supra note 164, at 1.
208. Id. at 30-31. The long incubation period of AIDS makes calculation of the im-
pact of any program difficult, but one indicator was the incidence of rectal gonorrhea, a
disease almost exclusively confined to homosexuals. In the two years before the closing,
it declined 75 percent in San Francisco. Id. For comparison, New York reported a 59
percent decrease between 1979 and 1983. Declining Rates of Rectal and Pharyngeal Gonor-
rhea Among M4ales - New York City, 33 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 295,
295-97 (1984).
209. See supra notes 196-197 and accompanying text.
210. San Francisco Chronicle, Dec. 21, 1984, at 2, col. 1; id. Nov. 30, 1984, at 70,
col. 1. It was also recognized that owner policing of consensual sex raised substantial
privacy problems of its own.





sex. (Unsafe sex was to be defined not by the health department,
but by the San Francisco AIDS Foundation, a private, gay-based or-
ganization.) The doors of individual cubicles and rooms were to be
removed (mooting the privacy issue). Finally, owners were required
to assist in efforts to educate patrons.212
Wonder's decision was a careful compromise, right down to the
selection of the AIDS Foundation as the arbiter of safe sex. The
problem is that the court was not asked to construct a compromise;
it was asked to apply the health law. In allowing any regulation, the
court accepted that the transmission of AIDS in the bathhouses was
a danger to public health. It accepted, that is, the city's medical as-
sessment of the risk. That done, the only task properly remaining
for the court was an examination of the chosen response according
to the standards set forth in this comment. In this case, where so
much hinged upon the most practical way to regulate specific sexual
behavior in a specific setting, medical standards were of relatively
little help in selecting a response. There was a consequent increase
in the importance of questions of enforcement, privacy rights, and
economic impact.213 One could argue that the judge took all these
into consideration in fashioning a remedy, but this argument fails to
deal with one basic element of the legal analysis: deference to the
judgment of the health official. Deference does not replace medical
evidence or foreclose judicial fact-finding, but where the medical ev-
idence on either side is equal, it does leave the decision to the re-
sponsible health official. While there was merit in the owners'
arguments, they were not strong enough to overcome the presump-
tion of appropriateness attached to the action of the city's health
officer. Silverman was not required to prove that those who argued
against closure were wrong. His burden was properly met by rea-
sonable medical evidence of risk and efficacy of response. The best
way to stop dangerous sex in the bathhouses was certainly a close
call, one that perhaps would better have been settled politically long
212. Id. at 2,3. A month later,Judge Wonder, in response to enforcement problems,
modified his decision to give Silverman the final word on the definition of unsafe sex.
San Francisco Chronicle, Dec. 21, 1984, at 2, col. 1.
213. Thus, for example, the attorney for the owners was left room to complain,
"The primary problem with the order is it requires private police forces and requires
that doors be removed so there's no private place patrons can go. A lot of people don't
want to have sex in front of other people." San Francisco Chronicle, Nov. 29, 1984, at
1, col. 5. Of course, this was precisely the point; the order clearly recognized that the
sex needed to be regulated, the question was, how? This question, the court's compro-
mise inadequately answered.
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before it reached Judge Wonder. Once in the courts, however, close
calls should go to health officials.
This was a hard case. The medical knowledge upon which deci-
sion-makers drew was less sure than that available to the courts in
the hepatitis or even the herpes cases. One's tendency in a hard
case may be to be more sympathetic to those whose basic rights are
being threatened, and to soften the impact of the health law accord-
ingly. This may be misguided. The bathhouse decision distorted
the health law decision-making process. Although the distortion
erred in favor of gay rights, that is hardly likely to be the usual out-
come. As the herpes cases show, the losers when political pressures
taint the assessment of risk or the choice of response are usually the
victims of the disease. As AIDS continues to spread, in heterosexual
consciousness if not heterosexual bodies, there may be pressure for
measures far worse than the closing of bathhouses - quarantine,
closing of bars, or even mandatory examination and registration.2 1 4
Such steps may not be medically justified, but whether they are al-
lowed or not will depend upon courts' insistence upon medical eval-
uations when applying the law. In the bathhouse case, the risk was
undisputed. There was no ideal way to respond to it; there was not
even a uniformly acceptable compromise. The court had to appor-
tion the burden of uncertainty, in the manner prescribed by law.
While it was not totally satisfactory, the response of closure should
have been accepted or rejected on the issue of whether the owners
had met their burden of proof. Not only is this the law, it is the only
way to preserve the protections against abuse of individual rights
that the health law provides.
IV. Conclusion
The state's police power to protect the public health is premised
on a medical assessment of risk, and guided in the choice of re-
sponse to that risk by a requirement that any step taken be the least
restrictive medically justified method of alleviating the problem.
Officials charged with selecting a response may, of course, consider
economic, social and political factors in selecting among medically
justified responses (including the choice to take no action), but they
can no more choose a medically unjustified response than they
214. For examples of proposed measures against AIDS, see AIDS - A New Reason to
Regulate Homosexuality, supra note 2, at 340-43; An Act Concerning Quarantine Measures
and the Reporting of Accidental Poisonings to the University of Connecticut Health




should be able to respond to a health risk that is politically but not
medically defined. It is not the purpose of the health law to balance
the burden of disease against the loss of individual rights. Rather,
the health law governs state actions when individual rights must be
abridged for the common good. In risk assessment, it sets a thresh-
hold test of the necessity of any action, which, in requiring a sub-
stantial medical showing, allows no action if there is no actual threat
to public health. In the response analysis, individual rights are pro-
tected by the least restrictive means test, but otherwise fall before a
medically sound state action. Thus, in enforcing valid restrictions
on the few, the law also protects individuals from arbitrary and ca-
pricious exercises of state power which respond only to the fears of
the general public.
The law was improperly applied in the herpes and AIDS cases dis-
cussed in this comment. The results neither protected public health
nor preserved individual rights against unnecessary intrusions. The
task of determining whether actual risks justify particular responses
is generic to the health law, and can only be adequately carried out
using the best possible medical information, strictly applied. Cases
raising the same issues will continue to arise. Currently, for exam-
ple, communities across the nation are facing the question of
whether or not to allow children with AIDS or ARC to attend public
schools. Many of these cases will probably be decided in court, in
an atmosphere of extreme public anxiety. 21 5 Courts must not suc-
215. As of September 2, 1985, there had been 165 reported cases of AIDS in chil-
dren under age thirteen; 113 of the children had died. There were 61 reported cases in
children between thirteen and nineteen. N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1985, at 1, col. 2. A
slightly greater number of children may be in the early stages of the disease, and as
many as 2400 children may have ARC. N.Y. Times, July 1, 1985, at 1, col. 3.
Using the model described in this comment to consider the admission of one of these
children to school, the decision-maker first would have to assess the medical risks posed
by children with AIDS. The CDC and state and local health departments in such heavily
affected states as Connecticut, New Jersey, New York and California, have all concluded
that children with AIDS or ARC may safely attend school in most cases. N.Y. Times,
Sept. 8, 1985, at 1, col. 2; AIDS Update, supra note 149, at 19; N.Y. Times,July 1, 1985, at
Al, col. 3, BI0, col. 1; San Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 13, 1985, at 1, col. 1. As the
Connecticut Guidelines put it, "The kinds of closer contact that can occur in school
(sharing of foods, kissing, wrestling),. . . were not assessed to be significant risks ....
Aids Update, supra note 149, at 20. The principal risks posed by AIDS in school arise
from bleeding, incontinence or open sores which expose children and teachers to infec-
tious body fluids. The use of gloves, band-aids and common sense readily alleviate
these risks. Id. Only uncoverable sores, a tendency to bite or mouth, or chronic inconti-
nence or bleeding coupled with poor habits of personal hygiene would justify exclusion
or segregation, and that would have to be decided on a case by case basis. Id. (The
consensus among medical experts is that AIDS is very close to Hepatitis B in degree and
manner of contagion. As has been seen, children with Hepatitis B have generally been
admitted to school in a non-segregated fashion. See supra note 62 and accompanying
text.) Thus, the mere presence of children with AIDS in the schools does not create a
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cumb to the pressure of public fear in cases such as these. They
must allow only those actions that are required by objective medical
evaluations. This may be unpopular, but it is right, and it is the law.
-Scott Burs
health risk which would justify their blanket exclusion or segregation. A court test of a
decision allowing AIDS children to attend school would certainly be the occasion for the
introduction of contrary medical evidence. Some AIDS researchers do question the
safety of mainstreaming AIDS victims. See N.Y. Times, Sept 14, 1985, at 27, col. 1.
However, even in the face of the general uncertainty about AIDS, the complainors
would have to show that the state's assessment did not conform to the available knowl-
edge and norms of medical and epidemiological practice.
Based on this assessment, an adequate response would have several elements: at the
least, it would involve a case by case determination of whether the child is one of those
whose behavior creates a greater risk. If so, it would have to be decided whether this
risk could be controlled within the school setting, or whether an alternative placement
would be required; if not, it would have to be decided who needed to know the child's
identity, and what steps could be taken to reassure and inform staff, parents and other
students.
Several communities were faced with this issue as school resumed in the fall of 1985.
Their responses have varied. In Swansea, Massachusetts, a hemophiliac teenager with
AIDS was admitted, and, while there have been some protests, many in the community
have gone out of their way to express their support for the decision and their sympathy
with his plight. N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1985, at 1, col. 2. New York City adopted the
consensus risk assessment and set up a panel to make case by case evaluations. The
panel consists of both medical and non-medical personnel. It has, to date, considered
four cases. One child was admitted to school; two were to receive special education in
the hospitals in which they were confined; and one child, who was well enough to go to
school but whose identity had been accidently revealed, was asked to accept home tutor-
ing "because of the potential social discrimination to which the student could be sub-
jected." N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1985, at 1, col. 2. Events in Swansea suggest that such
discrimination is avoidable, but it remains unclear whether New York would have taken
the risk of normal admission if the child's parents had insisted.
Elsewhere, the results have been less promising. In Florida, Connecticut, California,
New Jersey and Indiana, children have been refused admission. Superintendent John
Dow of New Haven, CT, justified his decision by saying, "There is extreme concern and
fear. It may not be right, but it's real." Id. The Ryan White case in Indiana is even more
unsettling, because of what appears to be a cynical sense on the part of school officials
and their lawyers that time is on their side. See supra note 49.
In the case of children with AIDS going to school, the law places the burden of uncer-
tainty on the public. Health and school officials may and should educate the public
about the true nature of the risk, but they may not exclude all children with AIDS merely
to ease public fears. The issue is complex, but it can also be simply put, as it was re-
cently by New York's Mayor Koch: "This child is no danger - no danger - to other
children. You can panic if you want to, but I hope you won't." N.Y. Times, Sept. 9,
1985, at B3, col. 4.
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